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SOUTH AFRICA
From Confrontation to Cooperation
By Mohamed El-Khawas
(First of two parts)

n the 1990s, unlike many previous de
cades, Southern Africa appears to be
inching closer to an era of peaceful co
existence.
At long last, South Africa appears to
be shifting from a confrontational stance
to that of cooperation with its neighbors,
particularly Angola and Mozambique.
But this has not always been the case.
On the contrary, South Africa’s destabili
zation campaigns, which began in the
mid-1970s, have wreaked havoc in the
region. As you will read in this two-part
series—the first part on Angola/South
Africa conflicts, and the second part on
Mozambique/South Africa conflicts—it
was a no-win situation for South Africa
from the start.
South Africa embarked on a destabili
zation campaign in several of its neigh
boring countries by the early 1980s. Pre
toria’s goal was to slow, if not halt, the
liberation struggles within its own bor
ders and in Namibia. The destabilization
campaign was designed to pressure
neighboring governments to withhold as
sistance from the liberation movements,
namely South Africa’s African National
Congress (ANC) and Namibia’s South
West Africa People’s Organization
(SWAPO). At the time, these move
ments had established camps within the
borders of several neighboring front-line
countries and were using these bases to
launch their armed struggles.
' South Africa’s aggressive stance paid
off in Swaziland and Lesotho, two land
locked nations that rely on South Africa
for economic survival and for contact
with the rest of the world. Using its mili
tary and economic power, Pretoria
forced these vulnerable governments to
oust South African refugees suspected of
being ANC fighters.
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The neutralization of these two coun
tries left Mozambique and Angola as the
only routes to South Africa and Namibia
open to the liberation movements, with
Zimbabwe already having decided to halt
ANC military operations out of its terri
tory. Consequently, Mozambique and
Angola bore the brunt of South African
military actions.
A detailed examination of the record of
South Africa’s destabilization of Angola
and Mozambique reveals the consider
able extent of this activity during the last
several years.
In this two-part analysis, each country
is singularly dealt with because Pre
toria’s relationship with Angola and Mo
zambique differed in style and substance.
South Africa’s hostility toward Angola
dates back to the 1975-1976 civil war,
for example, while its destabilization
campaign against Mozambique did not
begin until 1981.
The destabilization campaign itself
was multifaceted, ranging from direct
military intervention and the backing of
anti-government insurgency, to outright
economic warfare.
South Africa and Angola

South Africa has been Angola’s bitter
enemy ever since the Movimento Popu
lar de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)
came into power in 1975 when Angola
became independent from Portuguese
colonial rule. South Africa’s goal was to
deny any kind of governing power to the
MPLA. It did not work, mainly because
the new Angolan government, under the
banner of the MPLA, fought back.
With the support of the United States,
South Africa opposed the MPLA’s social
ist ideology, its close ties to the Soviet
bloc, and its commitment to majority rule
in Southern Africa. The plan was to in
stall pro-Western factions in power in
Angola, namely the Frente Nacional de
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol17/iss2/7

Libertacao de Angola (FLNA) and the
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia
Total de Angola (UNITA).1 Both South
Africa and the U.S. believed a friendly
regime woudl protect Western interests
in the region; halt growing Soviet influ
ence in Africa; and slow the tide of liber
ation that was rapidly approaching the
borders of Namibia and, indeed, South
Africa.
A civil war engulfed Angola shortly
after its independence and continues to
this day. But following early MPLA vic
tories, with the support of Cuban troops
and a massive Soviet arsenal, South
Africa initiated an aggressive stance di
rected at Angola. In December 1977,
South Africa’s Prime Minister John Vorster announced his country’s plan for
military intervention in the form of
“large-scale, pre-emptive, and follow-up
strikes.”2 Shortly thereafter, South Afri
can forces raided a SWAPO base at Cassinga, in southern Angola, and kidnapped
145 Namibian refugees. And in March,
1979, South African planes bombed an
ANC military training camp inside
Angola.3
Two years later, Pretoria had become
even more aggressive toward Angola,
with the occupation in 1981 of a substan
tial area of southern Angola.4 This was
done ostensibly to halt SWAPO’s infil
tration across the border and, in turn, to
cut the level of its activities inside Nami
bia. The European Economic Commu
nity (EEC) reported in 1981 that South
African troops were “involved in nearly
2,000 operations inside Angola” and their
aggression “caused nearly $7 billion in
damage and displaced 13,000 persons
between 1975 and 1980.”5
South African invasions and bombings
in southern Angola have been coupled
with South African support for Angolan
rebel forces. Pretoria has continued to
provide financial and material assistance

for UNITA’s protracted war. It also has
allowed UNITA to use South Africa’s
broadcasting facilities to spread antigovernment propaganda in Angola.6 In
addition, Black members of the South
African Army joined UNITA forces dur
ing some of its operations.7
UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, has ac
knowledged his connection with South
Africa, an arrangement that has enabled
him to sustain the civil war since 1976.
As Robert I. Rotberg put it: “South Afri
can air cover, logistical and refueling sup
port and, at times, direct military inter
vention have been critical in the growth
of UNITA as a formidable fighting
machine.”8
With Pretoria’s material and physical
backing, UNITA has conducted a cam
paign designed “to grind the Angolan
economy down, to halt development, and
destroy agriculture.” Such a campaign
has had damaging effects on Angola’s
economy, “rendering the diamond mines
unprofitable, . . . destroying the food ex
porting sector, . . . and forcing suspen
sion of most development projects.”9 It
has made it unsafe for foreigners to work
in the mining sector and has shut down
the Benguela Railroad which, prior to in
dependence, took in as much as $100
million a year from transporting minerals
from Zambia and Zaire to Atlantic coast
ports.
Also, UNITA’s insurgency has suc
ceeded in disrupting the economy and in
diverting national resources away from
needed economic development. About
75 percent of the Angolan national bud
get is taken up by military expenditures;
the country has spent $2 billion on Soviet
weapons in two years, for example, to
shore up its military capabilities to fight
both UNITA’s insurgency and South Afri
ca’s undeclared war.10
South African forces have repeatedly
intervened militarily on UNITA’s behalf
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1990
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when the going got rough. In September
1985, for instance, when the Angolan
Army captured Cazombo and was pre
paring to attack Savimbi’s headquarters
in Jamba, South Africa’s heavy air strikes
saved UNITA.11 Four months earlier,
Angolan and Cuban forces had foiled an
attack on Chevron oil installations in Ca
binda by South African commandos.12
Thus, UNITA has been able to expand
its destabilization campaign because of
South Africa’s assistance—a campaign
that has been directed against Angolan
civilians, foreign technicians, and eco
nomic targets.
UNITA’s destabilization campaign,
coupled with South Africa’s military in
tervention, have made Angola’s security
heavily dependent on Cuban troops. Cu
bans have enabled Angolans to fend off
repeated South African military incur
sions, which had increased in frequency
and intensity since 1981. In addition,
Cuban forces freed the Angolan Armed
Forces to meet threats posed by
UNITA’s campaign in southeast Angola.
As noted before, Pretoria’s support for
UNITA and its periodic invasion of
Angola were “aimed at toppling the
MPLA government and installing a more
sympathetic
regime.”13 Thus
far,
however, this strategy has been a failure.
The Namibia Factor

Angola, from early on, has been pursuing
a negotiated settlement for the conflict in
Namibia. And it was responsive to West
ern initiatives on this matter—initiatives
spearheaded by the United States under
the Carter administration. The Angolan
government was also instrumental in ob
taining SWAPO’s approval for the West
ern plan for Namibia’s independence
from South Africa’s military occupation,
which was also approved by South Africa
and embodied in the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 435 in 1978. That
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The Angolan government
showed some flexibility by
publicly committing itself
to the removal of Cuban
troops.

plan called for a cease-fire and U.N.supervised elections for a National As
sembly that would draft a constitution
leading to independence.14
In the 1970s and well into the 1980s,
South Africa showed no intention of im
plementing the Western plan, apparently
out of concern that SWAPO would win at
the ballot box. Pretoria, with the encour
agement of the Reagan administration,
demanded the removal of all Cuban
troops from Angola as a precondition for
Namibia’s independence.15
Angola’s immediate reaction was to re
fuse to negotiate the withdrawal of
Cuban troops as part of the parcel for
Namibia’s settlement. Lucio Lara, then
secretary-general of Angola’s ruling
party, asserted that “these are two en
tirely different problems.” He added that
Cuban troops “have been staying in
Angola at the request of the Angolan
government.”16 [It should be noted here
that the Cuban presence was critical to

Angola, especially to its ability to defend
itself against South Africa’s continuing
aggression and to combat the insurgency
efforts of UNITA. Southern Angola, for
instance, was occupied by South Africa
at one time for up to two years. ]
The Angolan government through
Paolo T. Jorgo, then foreign minister,
made it clear that “when the threat from
South Africa disappears—and we believe
it will with the independence of
Namibia—then we won’t need the Cuban
presence here.17 This was largely be
cause Namibia likely will serve as a buf
fer zone between Angola and South
Africa. Furthermore, independent Nami
bia, under SWAPO, will not likely allow
UNITA to operate out of its territory. It
is expected that, under these conditions,
UNITA’s insurgency would wither away.
As the stalemate over the linkage of
Cuban withdrawal and the independence
of Namibia continued, South Africa un
leashed its military might against Angola.
In December 1983, South Africa invaded
Angola; its artillery and bombers struck
about 200 miles deep into Angola in a
bold attempt to cripple SWAPO
operations.
South African officials argued that “the
operation is designed to increase
pressure on the Angolan authorities to
withdraw their support from SWAPO,
just as South Africa is seeking to per
suade Mozambique to disown the
ANC.”18 Ironically, this South African in
vasion of Angola “coincided with a U.S.sponsored effort to foster warmer re
lations between South Africa and Mo
zambique.”19
When the South African operation
continued for several weeks, Moscow, in
an unusual diplomatic move, asked Pre
toria to get out of Angola. The Soviets
made it clear that “South Africa’s contin
ued occupation of part of Angola is unac
ceptable.”20
3
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To save its policy of “constructive en
gagement,” the U.S. moved to reduce
tensions between South Africa and
Angola. At the end of January 1984,
Chester A. Crocker, then assistant
secretary of state for African affairs, was
able to persuade South Africa to begin
pulling out its troops. His effort led to:
the signing of a cease-fire between South
Africa and Angola; the withdrawal of
South African troops from southern
Angola; and the establishment of a joint
commission,
including
American
observers, to monitor military disen
gagement along the Angolan-Namibian
border.21
Encouraged by the cease-fire agree
ment, Pretoria launched its own initiative
to settle the outstanding issues in the re
gion. In March 1984, Foreign Minister
Roelof F. Botha proposed the convening
of a regional conference to solve the re
maining problems in Namibia and Angola.
He called for a meeting of South Africa,
Angola, UNITA, SWAPO and Namibia’s
internal parties to discuss their problems
and to reach a broader regional
settlement. Angola, however, rejected
Botha’s proposal. The Luanda govern
ment had objections to sitting down with
UNITA or with Pretoria to discuss its in
ternal affairs.22
On the Cuban troops issue, the Ango
lan government showed some flexibility
by publicly committing itself to the re
moval of Cuban troops from Angola. In a
joint communique in Havana in March
1984, Angola’s President Jose Eduardo
dos Santos and Cuba’s President Fidel
Castro proposed a gradual Cuban with
drawal from Angola provided the follow
ing conditions were met:
■ A unilateral withdrawal of South
African soldiers from Angolan
territory.
■ The acceptance of [the] United
Nations ruling calling for the withhttp://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol17/iss2/7

fact using the Cubans as a pretext to further delay Namibia’s independence.

In August 1988, Crocker
succeeded in getting
South Africa to withdraw
its forces from southern
Angola.

drawal of South African troops
from Namibia and its “true” in
dependence.
■ The cessation of all acts of ag
gression against Angola by South
Africa, the United States and its
allies, and an end to aid for
“counter-revolutionaries.”23
The first two conditions were easy to
meet because the withdrawal of South
African troops from Angola was already
underway and was expected to be com
pleted by mid-April if Angola fulfilled its
pledge to halt SWAPO’s infiltration
across the border. In addition, Pretoria
had publicly committed itself to imple
menting the 1978 U.N. Security Council
Resolution 435 once an agreement was
worked out for the withdrawal of the
Cuban troops. As for the third condition,
there seemed to be no problem since
South Africa had signed a non-aggression
pact with Mozambique.24 The key ques
tion hinged on whether Pretoria was in

29

A Stumbling Block

The Angolan government tried again to
break the stalemate over the Cubans,
which had become a stumbling block in
the way of Namibia’s independence. In
October 1985, dos Santos reiterated his
offer to negotiate the withdrawal of
Cuban troops from his country. He pro
posed a phased withdrawal of 20,000
Cuban soldiers while keeping about
12,000 in the capital and around Cabin
da25 to protect Chevron’s oil installations,
which generate as much as 90 percent of
Angola’s foreign exchange earnings. But
another hitch developed. The Reagan ad
ministration aligned itself with South
Africa by insisting that UNITA be in
cluded in “a national reconciliation gov
ernment.”26
In response, Angola’s foreign trade
minister, Ismael Gasper-Martins, said in
Washington, in January 1986, that his
government had no intention of forming a
coalition with UNITA, which Angola
viewed as a South African proxy. He
warned that U.S. aid to Angolan rebels
was “bound to have a negative impact on
the U. S.-brokered negotiations between
his government and South Africa for the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola
and the independence of Namibia.”27
Despite this warning, the Reagan ad
ministration resumed covert military as
sistance for UNITA,28 assistance which
had been cut off in 1976.
Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, Angola’s
minister of energy and petroleum, de
nounced the Reagan administration’s re
newed support for UNITA’s Savimbi. He
said his government was firm in its “re
fusal to negotiate a political settlement
with [Savimbi].” Van-Dunem also noted
that U.S. military assistance for UNITA
would force Luanda to seek additional
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1990
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30 military aid from the Soviet bloc; it would
also increase Angola’s dependence on
Cuban troops.
Angola’s immediate answer to the re
sumption of U.S. military aid to UNITA
was to suspend its participation in U.S.sponsored talks on the withdrawal of
Cuban troops and the independence of
Namibia. This boycott lasted for more
than a year. But in April 1987, Angolan
and American officials met in Brazzaville,
Congo, and agreed to resume nego
tiations.29
Although more talks formally opened
in Luanda in July 1987, no progress was
made. American officials elected to wait
until Angola submitted new proposals to
break the stalemate over the Cuban
troop withdrawal.
In response, dos Santos met with Cas
tro in Havana in August and expressed
his readiness to be more flexible in nego
tiations. The U.S. welcomed the state
ment but asked for more specific propo
sals on the issue.30 No progress was
made and the Angolan government em
barked on a military solution for the civil
war in 1987. It launched massive of
fenses to attempt to wipe out UNITA’s
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forces by destroying its supply and com
munications lines, and by capturing its
headquarters in Jamba. But a swift mili
tary intervention by South Africa saved
UNITA, again.31
In response to the rising tensions be
tween Luanda and Pretoria, dos Santos
made a request for additional Cuban
troops to shore up Angola’s defenses.
Consequently, between 10,000 and
15,000 new Cuban troops arrived in
1988, bringing the total to 50,000. The
Angolan authorities resolved to deploy
Cuban troops in the south, raising the
possibility of a military confrontation with
South Africa. In addition, new airfields
were opened at Cahama and Xangongo,
giving the Angolan Air Force new capa
bilities to challenge South Africa’s viola
tions of Angola’s southeastern airspace.32
The Botha government was faced with
a dilemma. It knew it would be costly to
try to push the Cuban troops away from
the border with Namibia. Also, it knew
this would probably result in higher
numbers of casualties among white
South Africans. Consequently, the South
African military concluded that there was
a need for a negotiated settlement to get
the Cubans out of Angola and to scale
down Pretoria’s military involvement in
Southern Africa.

A Final Settlement

In May 1988, the U.S. tried again to find
a broader settlement for the conflicts in
Southern Africa. The adversaries were
ready to move forward this time because
Washington and Moscow pressured them
to find political solutions.
In August 1988, Crocker succeeded in
getting South Africa to withdraw its
forces from southern Angola. He then
continued his mediation efforts toward an
agreement on the Cuban troop with
drawal from Angola, as well as for Nami
bia’s independence. His efforts paid off.
After several meetings at five lo
cations between South Africa, Angola,
and Cuba, under U.S. auspices—in Lon
don, Cairo, New York, Geneva and Braz
zaville—two agreements were signed on
December 22, 1988. Consequently,
Cuban troops were phased out of Angola
starting in April 1989, with total with
drawal expected to be completed by July
1991.
As for Namibia, South Africa reduced
its forces to 1,500 in the territory by July
1989. This was accompanied by the de
ployment of a U.N. peace-keeping force
in the territory. And in November 1989,
the U.N. supervised a historical election
for a Constituent Assembly.
The Assembly’s adoption of a new
constitution put Namibia on the road to
independence—on March 21, 1990.33
These developments have left UNITA
out in the cold. South Africa has pledged

5
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to halt its assistance to UNITA. This
does not mean that the civil war in
Angola has come to an end, however, be
cause President Bush has assured Savimbi that American military assistance
will continue and his administration will
withhold recognition of the Luanda gov
ernment until a settlement is reached.
American officials have urged African
governments to pressure both sides in
the Angolan conflict to form a govern
ment of national reconciliation.34
African mediation has resulted in the
signing of the Gbadolite Accord on June
22, 1989. Both dos Santos and Savimbi
have agreed on an immediate cease-fire
and have accepted Zaire’s President Mo
butu seso Seko’s mediation to prepare
the implementation of the national recon
ciliation plan.35 Since then, however, vio
lations of the cease-fire have been fre
quent. And Savimbi has not shown up for
scheduled meetings in Zaire. This has
cast doubts over the possibility of ending
the civil war in Angola in a speedy
fashion.
Nevertheless, the dramatic develop
ments within South Africa lately, among
them the unbanning of the ANC and the
release of ANC leaders, including Nelson
Mandela, from prison, may well halt
South Africa’s support for UNITA. □
Next: South Africa and Mozambique.
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